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SUBSISTENCE ECONOMIES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
R. S. Eckaus - G. Rosen
I. Introduct ion
The concept of a subsiEtence economy has had considerable
intuitive appeal as a description of underdeveloped areas. There
is an akpparent correspondence with characteristic conditions which,
though rough, seems impressive. We, too, believe this is a useful
concept and, in fact, can be even more useful than it has been,
not only for underdeveloped countries but also for "underdeveloped"
sectors of advanced economies. A careful analysis of subsistence
cond.itions can not only help isolate the crucial features of
subsistence economies but also suggest hypotheses about the sources
of growth.
Much of the recent analysis of economic growth has, so to
speak, jumped into the middle of the probIdt and concentrated on
"conditions of growth:" "arranted," "sustained," "take-off" and so
on. In an earlier tradition, Schumpeter and, recently, W. Arthur
Lewis, have started with description of an economy which is not
growing and then asked why and how it may change. Each approach
1. The authors are grateful for the suggestions of Mr. S.
Chakravarty and Professors Hagen, Lefeber and Rosenstein-Rodan.
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2has its virtues but the special appeal of the eailier one is that
it makes possible a more thorough analysis of the transition from
stagnation to growth. This essay will follow in that earlier
tradition in its concern with the characteristics of subsistence
economies and some aspects of their transition to growing economies.
It would be possible to define "subsistence" economies in such
a way as to cover a wide variety of cases. However, it is not our
intention to cover variety but to expose it and at the same time
to indicate anal ytical methods which bring order to it and high-
light significant relationships. One aspect of the research effort
on underdeveloped economies in recent years has been the search
for the grail of a "general theory" of economic development. For
a number of reasons no available "general" theory seems adequate.
First of all, the demands on growth theory to provide guides to
pressing issues of current economic development are quite specific.
Moreover, the underdeveloped regions display quite widely differing
characteristic features which create major problems when the attempt
is made to subsume all of them within a single model. Finally, of
course, the problems of growth, even in specific cases, are analy-
tically quite difficult, involving, as they do, intertemporal,
intersectoral and locational issues.
In this paper we attempt to apply economic analysis to the
behavior of "traditional" economies--a range of problems which
economists have shown some willingness to turn over to sociologists
and anthropologists. The failure of some "general" economic principle
t a-
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to operate is frequently explained by adducing some particular
"noneconomic" motive or a sociological or anthropological "quirk."
We do not have a new type of economics to apply, but we are willing
to adjust the usual assumptions of economics to fit the particular
situations encountered in underdeveloped areas and even insist
upon the necessity of doing so. Having done this, familiar analy-
tical methods can be applied with profit.
In the next section same alternative ways of looking at
subsistence economics are examined. A simple analytical description
of subsistence sectors is presented which is then used in succeeding
sections. These are devoted to a description of particular sectors
under subsistence conditions and to the analysis of sume features
of the process of transition to economic growth.
II. Subsistence Economies
A. The Varieties
Perhaps the most common connotation of subsistence is an
economy in which all, or a large part, of the population lives
at, or close to, the minimum physical standard of life. It
may have been brought to this level as the result of the
operation of Malthusian processes of population growth in
relation to the growth of output of food and other necessaries.
Practically, of course, it will make a difference for savings
and investment potentials and the processes of growth whether
it is all or a part of the population which is at subsistence
L1
levels. However, we will return to the discussion of inequality
in subsistence economies below.
Of course, it is possible to imagine that processes other than
the Malthudian which might limit a population to physical subsistence
conditions short of the 'hatural" boundaries imposed by population
growth and diminishing returns. The famous "potlatch" is constantly
cited to bedevil economists into checking the cultural relevance
of their behavioral assumptions. This reminder to economists
working on underdeveloped areas is not out of place.
The Malthusian notion of subsistence is clear cut because
it is an extreme position. Short of that extreme position no other
such fixed point can be established in the subsistence spectrum.
One man's and one nation's luxuries may be another's necessities.
Some societies have been known to adopt drastic measures to avoid
income levels to which other societies become accustomed. The
powerful and pervasI ve personal and cultural factors, which affect
the evialuation of what constitutes subsistence operate differently
in each individual and society.
In the Malthusian case minimum physical requirements derive
their significance from their operation as an absolute check to
population and income growth. However, in the process of a decline
in per capita income under population pressure, subsistence might
be reached, in the sense of savings dropping away to nothing long
before income fell to the minium physical requirements level.
Partial checks to further population growth also develop short of
the physical minimum levels of income as the rate of new family
formation drops, and so on. These are not merely logical possi-
bilities, but seem in fact to occur frequently and to be important.
Under conditions of diminishing returns, growth in output can not
occur without savings and investment. There are, of course, rare
situations of constant or even increasing returns to population
growth, but that cannot be the normal expectation.
It may violate accepted usage and be found somewhat jarring
to use "subsistence" to describe all those economies with zero
savings. However, we are willing to extend the word and violate
convention in order to draw attention to the range of conditions
less extreme than, but similar to, Malthusian subsistence in their
implications for growth. For the extended definition to be useful,
it must be given more content.
The economist needs a framework of classification and analysis
which summarizes the economic implications of all those influences
which affect the intertemporal distribution of income between
consumption and saving. The complete specification of such a
framework is a complicated problem in capital theory. It is not
our intention here to enter deeply into such issues but to develop
some simple and suggestive models which will help to organize
our thinking about subsistence economies. Since our objective
is not to provide comprehensive analytical conclusions, but rather
only to organize the relevant factors, we may escape some of the
dangers inherent in simplicity.
6It is a logically exhaustive description to stipulate that
spending-saving decisions of individuals depend on their time
preferences and the intertemporal substitution possibilities open
to them. Such a description covers all possible cases; being so
general it does not go very far in increasing our understanding
of reality unless something more is specified about the character-
istics of particular situations.
Zero saving logically can and, in fact, has occurred at a
wide variety of income levels and in various existing econmic
models. In this paper we are interested only in relatively low
income level subsistence conditions and are concerned to make the
point that even this can occur in different ways. 1
In the limit of the Malthusian case, for example, no saving
will take place whatever the intertemporal substitution possibilities
available via the interest rate or the real productivity of saving.
The ultimate nature of the circumstances forbid it. Short of the
Malthusian limit the usual and, we believe, reasonable expectation
is that the degree of preference of present over future consumption
varies inversely with the level of income.
The classical stationary state and modern "stagnation" on
the other hand are the result, not so much of a high preference
for present over future consumption, but of progressively diminishing
returns to all factors. In these cases it is the decline in the real
1. Some obvious analogies with high income level stagnation
will occur to the reader.
7productivity of saving which brings about stagnation, not Malthusian
pressure, which destroys saving through dire poverty.
One function of foreign aid may be described as lifting incomes
to levels at mich, given existing intertemporal substitution
possibilities, sufficient saving will take place to sustain growth.
Frequently in underdeveloped areas the productivity of investment
is quite low, at least on the scale available to the individual
household. This, in some situations, may be the consequence of
relatively primitive technologies. "Imperfections" which limit
access to investment opportunities are probably important in other
circumstances. If such obstacles to increased productivity of
investment are overcome, saving may be induced without changes
in time preference. Technical assistance, another aspect of
efforts to aid underdeveloped areas, can be interpreted as an
effort to increase the productivity of saving.
Provision of social overhead capital which increases the
productivity of private saving and investment may have simila
effects.
There may be no general agreement as to mhether policies are
feasible which are designed to increase saving by directly influ-
encing the time-preference curves of individuals. Some of the
exhortation which accompanies development programs could be
interpreted in this wy,1 as can government action to force saving
1. The exanples of "national effort" cited by Professor
Kindleberger in "Group Behavior and International Trade,"
Journal of Political Economy, February 1951, pp. 30-46, may also
fit this description in some respects.
8without general support; individual time preferences do not shift
in this case but preferences of the decision-making body aupercede
those of individuals.
Whether or not time preferences can be operated on directly,
they are undoubtedly influenced indirectly by economic changes
which in turn effect expectations and the individual's notion
that he can effectively plan and provide for the future. Socio-
logical changes vhich are often associated with econamic growth,
as, for example, the decay of the extended family system that
accompanies urbanization will also influence saving-spending
behavior.
The pattern of income distribution is an important determinant
of over-all spending-saving behavior. This relationship has been
much discussed in the literature on economic development. The
only further point which we should like to make here, and mbich
shall be elaborated below, is that saving does not necessarily
depend on the maintenance of, or an increase in, inequality.
The previous discussion of time preference applies as well to the
high income recipients in low per capita income countries as to
the lower income recipients.
The occurrence of low-level subsistence is, then, not simply
and only a function of income levels. Professor Everett Hagen has,
we believe, quite rightly made the point that savings can be generated
in many societies in which there is currently full consumption
because of low levels of per capita income levels if individual
time preferences can be altered or are superceded. This observation
t e
9is a valuable counter to the view that the primary bottleneck in
development is lack of capital in the sense that there are certain,
more fnamental factors wich account for the inadequacy. It
may still be true, however, that capital availability is the major
operational factor.
B. Resource Allocation in Subsistence Economies.
The nature of the adjustment of the labor supply in subsistence
economies to the c--eimtary resources which are available deserves
more critical attention than it has received. This adjustment is
usually assumed by economists to be made in accordance with the
familiar marginal, maximizing principles. On the other hand anthro-
pologists will typically deny that rational behavior in this sense
in characteristic of "firms" in subsistence econmies. There is,
in fact, considerable question as to the extent to which there is
complete rationality in using resources in firms in advanced
countries. The behavior which does seem to characterize subsistence
firms is the use of all available resources within the given,
acceptable social patterns, to obtain the maximm possible output.
Yet, it is widely believed by economists that competitive pressures
and the relative effectiveness of marginal decisions serves ads
quately to separate the quick and the dead. Therefore, whatever
its relation to individual psychology and behavior, the assumption
or rational, profit-maximizing entrepreneurial activity is generally
considered to be the best basis for an economic theory of both
subsistence economies and sectors and advanced economies.
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We suggest, however, that in subsistence economies structure
of "firms" is typically such that there is no advantage or relative
effectiveness of marginal decisions. In this case then individual
behavior does not correspond to that of marginal maximization as
in advanced econnmies and there is no mechanism to insure that
the system worked as if it did.
In low-level subsistence econcnies, and such sectors of
advanced economies, the basic production organization Is the
household. There may be some workers vho are not members of the
familial unit, but, quite often, these are also treated as if a
responsibility existed for them simila to that for family
members. By contrast in the corporate form ihich diminates
advanced economies all the members of the organization are
employees and treated with a good deal of impersonality.
In small-scale household firms the labor availabilities as
well as most other costs are fixed. In agriculture land rents,
implicit or explicit, frequently are not a function of output on
each unit of land; those cases in which they are, that is, share-
cropping, will be analyzed separately. Fertilizer and certain types
of farm maintenance requirements have some degree of variability
with output but fertilizer inputs at least are relatively sma1.
in low income areas and farm maintenance represents mainly labor
costs in such situations. In industrial activity material require-
ments are a variable cost but, to the extent there is production
to order rather than for stock, these may also be considered as
if they were fixed.
A, 4
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In firms in i&ich all costs are fixed there is no difference
between rational profit maxmi zation and output maximi zation. The
latter is the rational rule. The anthropological "quirk" of
household firms which pay no attention to marginal equalities
turns out to be just good sense.
It is true, however, and we suggest it is important, that
such firms will tend to use resources in different combinations
and produce at different output levels as compared to firms in
which labor costs are variable. WIhen costs are variable, the
logic and relative effectiveness is inescapable of output and
input decisions vhich require on returns on the margin to just
cover costs on the margin. Though it is possible it cannot in
general be expected that the "marginal" and the "total" decision
would be equivalent.
This point can be demonstrated very simply in Figure 1.
With the given total revenue in relation to outputl and the total
cost relation A, in which there are a high proportion of variable
costs, the optimum, profit-maximizing output is X1 at which marginal
revenues are equal to marginal costs. If all the 'costs at X1 are
turned into fixed costs, X3 is st 11 the profit-maximixing output
if the available factors do not change. However, we do not
believe that it can, in general, be assumed that households will
adjust their internal labor supply to bring them precisely to
1. Although the total revenue curve as shown does, perforce,
embody some assumptions about the variation of demand, these are
only incidental; the argument does not hinge on them.
32
output X1 . It is just as likely, and under same conditions more
likely, that they will end up at a point like X2 which is dictated
by the available household labor supply. The total cost curve B
is drawn to indicate that the household considers it impossible
to achieve outputs higher than X2.
The importance of the "organization" of the firm for output
and factor combination decisions can be made even clearer by use
of another type of graph as in Figure 2a and 2b. These 3hov, for
a "representative firm", the variations in the total, average and
marginal products with different amounts of labor, given a fixed
amount of complementary resources. such as land, and, also, the
wage payments to labor. If the wage rate were such as is indi-
cated by the slope of the wage payments line the profit-maximizing
employer of labor would use LE. amounts of labor. If this were
a household firm with Lu amounts of labor available, that amount
would be used.
Suppose the firm of Figures 2a and 2b is in a subsistence
sector. Labor would be available at subsistence wages, at least
as a long-run condition, if the subsistence position were a
stable equilibrium. For unstable subsistence equilibria,
subsistence wages are only a transitory phenomenon and we shall,
therefore, not concern ourselves with this case. The character
of the population growth mechanism which keeps the economy at
1. The curve as drawn indicates that technology is not so
limiting that there is no problem of adjustment of labor svply.
The adjustment possibilities also may not be as smooth as shown in
Figure 2.
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subsistence need not detain us at this point either. A simple
Malthusian mechanism or one of the more realistic models presented
by Professor Hagenl may be assumed to be operating. The wage
payments line in this case would represent the total subsistence
requirements of different amounts of labor.
If can be seen from Figures 2a and 2b that equality of total
output with the total subsistence requiremants of the population
implies that the labor input is L., where average product is
equal to the dubsistence wage. Expansion of the labor supply
to Ls would be the result of a Malthusian process mhere firms are
family-owned and labor is essentially self-employed. Although the
"last" units of labor would not be earning their keep, distribution
of the total product over the labor supply would just cover their
subsistence requirements. The profit-maximizing employer of labor,
however, would use labor units only up to where the marginal
product is equal to the subsistence wage; at that point rents,
indicated by the distance between the total product and total
subsistence requirements curve in Figure 1ha, would be a maxim=.
The Malthusian mechanism in this case clearly leads to quite different
results than in the case of self-employed labor.
Although "Malthusian" population growth is require'd to push
the labor input all the we 3 to Ls, even in non-Malthusian condi-
tions tendencies exist among self-employed labor and family firms
1. E. E. Hagen, "Population and Ecoamic Growth," American
Economic Review, Vol. XLIX, No. 3, June 1959, pp. 310-327.
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to push the input beyond LE. These would, moreover, not necessarily
be irrational. It is the employer of labor who clearly should
maximize profits. However, if alternative opportunities do not
exist for the family labor in excess of Lg, or if the conditions
of such opportunities are considered quite undesirable, the excess
labor will be used to maximize the return on the total available
resources, which includes both capital and labor. As suggested
above, it cannot in general be assuned that families ad.ust their
sizes with a careful eye on the labor supply position vhich gives
the greatest surplus over subsistence requirements.
If firms of entrepreneurial-employers appear they will dis-
place self-employed and family firms which operate as shown in
Figure3 2a and 2b where there are diminishing returns to labor.
The entrepreneurial employers, using labor more efficiently ill
make profits (or rents) and can use these to undercut the self-
employed and family firms. If the latter are already at the
Malthusian limit L. they will be forced out of the sector as they
are pushed below the limit. If such firms are short of the Mal-
thusian limit they have some amount of rents to cushion the blows
of competition.
If there are constant orincreasing returns to labor, i.e. no
scarce "second" factor, then, of course, the employer-entrepreneur
has no advantage over the self-employed or family firm.
Figure 3 includes a total product curve in which the marginal
productivity of labor is zero after Lo labor inputs. If subsistence
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requirements- are shown by the curve S then the Malthusian limit
to growth of the labor supply is LB. Families Which, for one
reason or another, do not grow to that limit will have higher per
capita incomes than families which do. This is particularly clear
in the case of Figure 3 because all labor beyond LO will be
"technologically" uneployed, and contribute absolutely nothing
to their oa subsistence requirements. All labor beyond L. adds
less to output than it consumes so family growth beyond that
point will affect savings and future income.
Rather than pursuing these coparisons abstractly we shall
now turn to specific consideration of particular economic sectors.
The previous analysis of subsistence economies and the comparison
of the resource use of the employer-entrepreneur and the self-
employed will be used to interpret current conditions in under-
developed economies, subsistence sectors in advanced economies and
historical patterns of development. In the following treatment
these theoretical models will be used as hypotheses to explain
economic patterns both static and dynamic.
III. Sectoral Patterns in Subsistence Econnmies.
A. Agriculture.
AgriculturAl both in advanced and underdeveloped economies
seems to have a special mystique and, indeed, it is often different
in some essential respects from industry. One such difference
arises out of the nature of the product: it often makes possible
the creation of a subsistence or even an expanding livelihood with
18
only a small degree of involvement in markets either for labor
or products. Another difference in many areas is the relatively
greater frequency of single proprietorships in agriculture as
compared to industry. The ability of farmers to isolate themselves
from markets helps explain the persistence of individual ownership
of land, and of lower productivity in agriculture than in industry.
It also helps explain the "irrational" pursuit of land oViarship
on the part of peasants who have had unpleasant experiences of the
instability of markets. Of course, if Malthusian population growth
has proceeded to its limit in agriculture then it no longer can
serve as a refuge against misfortune.
The nonmonetization of a rural sector is not a crucial
characteristic of a subsistence situation. All the transactions
necessary in a subsistence or growth economy, at least in small,
local economic units, can take place without monetization. Saving
can be done in real terms and investment carried out by providing
goods in payment. The fact that monetization is not a necessary
characteristic of a growth economy does not, of course, mean that
it is unirportant. We do not have to repeat here the functional
advantages of a money system. Monetization and participation inmarkets
do not, in turn rule out subsistence agriculture. Subsistence or
near-subsistence economies or economic sectors with local, virtually
complete self-sufficiency are known; so also are economies with
some mixture of cash and subsistence crop production. An agricul-
tural sector may supply output to international markets and behave
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in a Malthusian way and, for that or other reasons, be at subsistence
income levels. There is no necessary relationship between "self-
sufficiency," "monetization," "poverty" and "savings" over a range
of income which covers both subsistence and growth situations. A
little diligence in searching seems to be all that is necessary
to find empirical counterparts of all the logical possibilities.
The analytical descriptions of types of subsistence economies
in Section II help to provide a general perception of the character-
istics of such economies and some possible patterns of change. But
an over-all view may miss economic features which are crucial.
For example, an increase in aggregate savings in a country in which
a strong, central goverment committed to economic development
displaces a weak and traditional government can be described
as a shift in time preference. Government tax and expenditure
policy is a phenomenon suitable for macroeconomic analysis.
Technological change imposed in large "lumps' from the outside
can similarly be analyzed effectively on a macro level. However,
when the sources of the change are widely dispersed and micro in
character in aggregative analysis is less useful as much of what
is important is averaged out in reaching the "typical" coneumer
and producer. We now want to take one step further and go behind
the aggregatek~atterna
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The 'typical" consumer-producer is an adequate representative
wben there is a rough equality of income distribution and in a
society which by tradition or other means imposes a general con-
formity in production and consuption. It is possible to find
actual counterparts of such economies at the subsistence level.
Such uniformities may arise from community ownership of land and
division of produce. An example would be the traditional economies
in certain African areas where the tribe, or extended family group,
practices a shifting cultivation without private ownership of land
or its produce.
More common, undoubtedly, are societies with marked income
inequalities. These may arise from a variety of sources which
deserve examination. The rate of saving in any economy is at
least partially determined by the degree of income inequality.
Thereforq understanding of the impact of changes in technology,
taxes and land reforms requires evaluation of their effects on
income distribution. As pointed out in Section II above,
entrepreneur-employers use different resource combinations with
labor than self-employed owner-operators of farms. Such dif-
ferences can be expected to lead to income inequalities. For
the moment, however, these types of factors will be set aside
and other sources of income inequality considered.
There are many types of "random" events which would create
income inequality even starting from an initial position of
equality. Individual differences in productive ability, inheritance
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practices, varying local land fertility and water availability are
all examples. The social demands of religion, custom and family
can create inequalities--where heavy dories mist be given to
daughters upon marriage, the bad luck of having many daughters
can ruin a family fortune.
These randomly operating influences, while preventing the
maintenance of equality, may also operate under certain conditions
to reduce the likelihood of increasing or even permanent concen-
trations of agricultural income. 1 Pamilies with a run of luck in
having good crop yields, few daughters and dutiful sons can expect
a run of bad luck to follow. Ability to survive a run of bad luck
depends on the individual' s or family's wealth and on how close
the family is to minimum subsistence requirements. The preserva-
tion of land ownership is, of course, particularly crucial for
the maintenance of future income. Since longer runs of bad luck
are less likely than short runs, the larger the wealth position
and the greater the "surplus" above minimum subsistence the
greater the likelihood of survival. If land holdings, for one
reason or another are small, that can be evidence of Lhe inaility
of the family to establish sufficiently large wealth positions to
insulate themselves against vicissitudes. Such small holdings
may also be the sources of such inability.
1. F. G. Bailey, in Caste a'.d the E-!onowic Frontier. describes
an Indian village society which seems to fit this pattern. But life
is full of variety. Louis Lefeber tells me that Transylvanian
peasants r:iorously limit the number of the offspring which can re-
main on the farm just to avoid splintering the family landholdings.
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This reasoning suggests the significance for rural income
distribution patterns and, therefore, rural savings, of relation-
ships between products, technology, land availability and family
size. There are constellations of these factors which could, in
relation to the randinly operating influences on income and
wealth described in the preceding paragraphs, effectively prevent
permanent income concentrations. Suppose, for example, that
because of the technology used land holdings are small relative
to family size so that incomes are near subsistence levels. If,
for the given particular range of products, there are sharply
decreasing and finally zero marginal returns to labor over the
"normal" range of family size, it will be quite difficult for
families to accumulate a "cushion" against misfortune. Thus, in
this case the random vicissitudes of life will be effective in
preventing increasing or "permanent" inequalities in income and
wealth.
A change in technology to create a range of constant or
increasing returns, a change in product to create a margin above
subsistence, a change in "normal" family size, all will change the
tendencies toward income equality.
The point made earlier that the levels of income regarded as
equivalent to subsistence are, short of the physical minimums,
themselves variable must also be taken into account here. This
is demonstrated in Figure 4; though the labor supply was already
at subsistence levels at L, an increase may still occur to Lo'
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which drives down subsistence to 8'. The new maxmtn profit position
also changes to Lg'. Even within any locality, the rough equality
of rent and individual wages will mean varying amounts of subsistence
depending on family size and similar variables.
Such changes, when they do occur, often involvechanges in
individual positions from farm owner-operators to tenants or
laborers or even landlords. In many rural areas, moreover, these
roles are not fully differentiated so that the same person will act
in more than one capacity. Changes in individual economic circm-
stances, rather than resulting in a sharp and abrupt shift in status,
will, in such cases, mean a shift in importance of one of the roles
and, perhaps, -the partial assumption of a new role. As pointed
out in the previous discussions of Figures 1 and 2 the use of labor
with other resources by the profit-maximizing landlord*.iA quite
different from that of the owner-operator. Thus it is necessary
to take the patterns of land ownership and operation into account
when discussing tendencies toward subsistence and inequality in
incomes in rural areas.
All that was written above about the vicissitudes in the
life of the owner-operator in the rural sector can be extended
to economies where at one stage of wealth, the owner-operator
becomes also a landlord. The chances of inheritance and family
size which may have been responsible do not, however, automatically
make him into an acquisitive profit-maximizing eployer-entrepreneur.
A shift from owner-operator to profit-aximizing landlord may
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also require a change in the social structure as yell as personal
attitudes. The landlord in this case is only in a somewhat more
favored position than the owner-operator and the concentration of
land is subject to the attrition of random processes similar to
those which created it.
There are, of course, many sources and kinds of landlords and
many kinds of landlord-tenant-laborer relations. The landlord
who holds title as the result of ancient coercion is no more neces-
sarily a profit maximizer than the one who has achieved his position
recently by hard work and good luck. Thorsometimes behave as if
they have a community of interest with their workers and tenants
who in turn are simply interested in maximizing the return to their
labor or in maintaining subsistence. This is one pattern of the
"benevolent" patron who, from his "original" land endowment provides
employment for all his client families, takes the share of product
necessary to maintain his position and provides, at least, sub-
sistence for his workers. He will, in a growing population, even-
tually be "over-employing" labor just as if it were self-employed.
In many instances landlords vill not have, or think they have,
complete freedom of choice in levying rents on their tenants or
in setting wage payments to their labor. We need not. elaborate
here on the power of traditional institutions and ways of thought.
Even if it occurred to landlords that the optimal use of labor
was at the point where its marginal product was equal to its wage,
it might not occur to them that they should actually try to move to
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that optimum position. And, if they did try to move they would
likely again find traditional barriers to change.
Hovever, when it is recognized, the maximum profit position
must be very attractive and must generate strong pressures for
movement to that positicn. We need not commit ourselves to a
complete economic determinism to explain certain features of rural
subsistence sectors as at least partially the result of the
attempts of landlords to maximize their rents. But, even if land-
lords manage to use the optima amount of labor and earn maximum
rents that in turn does not guarantee that they will have a high
savings rate. It may only lead to high living. The picture of
the traditional landlord in many parts of the world is that of an
avaricious individual but with a high rate of time preference.
However, as pointed out above unequal incomes are not simply
the result of landlord-tenant relationships but spring from a
variety of sources. In a subsistence economy the savings of one
group are matched by the dissaving of the rest. In effect the
group with a surplus above subsistence will provide what is literally
a vages fund for the income group below subsistence. This transfer
is achieved by loans from the net-saving group to the net dissaving
group. The typically high interest rates provide the mechanism
by which constmption is made more equal than incomes. Such interest
rates in subsistence agriculture are, in considerable part, a
reflection of extreme poverty which creates not only a willingness,
but a necessity, to exchange future for present consumption on the
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part of the borrower. We should not be surprised to find a phenomenon
like this in India, for example, in which peasants must use their
fertilizer for fuel instead.
Though income inequality and high interest rates are not only
the result of landlord-tenant relationships, these relations do,
of course, often play a major role. 'Ienants, for various reasons
will tend to behave like owner-operators. They may, in fact, have
a dual status, and may be intermixed in the village with landlords.
If they can force down rent payments sufficiently by claiming
higher subsistence requirements, there is no reason why they
should not add to their families. However, rent contracts are
generally not changed with each addition to the tenants family.
Conventional rents may leave a surplus for a small tenant family
but can work drastically against growing families. These latter
in subsistence economies will finally have to borrow against the
future for consumption loans.
In turn the optimizing landlord would find it advantageous
to fix rent contracts which leave less than subsistence, lending
back part of the output at high interest rates. Accumulation of
interest serves to perpetuate the arrangement and the pressure on
tenant's subsistence. This arrangement also gives the landlord
control of a larger part of the inventories which is often desirable
where harvests and transport are uncertain. It shifts the task
of calculating the workers subsistence to the price system via the
interest rate and eliminates the necessity of changing the rental
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fees with each harvest. Interest rates and rent charges are thus
closely related in subsistence economies.
Share crcpping arrangements represent the abdication by the
landlord of the attempt to maximize his returns on his land, or,
perhaps, the existence of institutional barriers to his doing so.
For example, in Figure 5 the profit or rent-maximizing position,
given the wage rates for labor as indicated by S, is using LE
units of labor. But if total returns are divided by a share cropping
arrangement as shown, the landlord's interest, like the tenant's
becomes the maximization of total product with the given factor
availabilities. At LO., the marginal productivity of labor is
still positive and the tenant's share is below total subsistence
requirements. In this case there is "room" for Malthusian popu-
lation growth to La. There is also an incentive for the landlord
to further subdivide the land and add sharecropping tenants even
beyond L. labor units as long as marginal productivity is rising.
Although the sharecroppers returns are less than subsistence re-
guirements at Ls, the landlord may yet be able to expand output
beyond this point if there is "part-time" labor available. 1
The ability of the landlord to keep his tenants at subsistence
depends on the alternatives available to them in land or other
employment. When land is abundant relative to the population, as
1. It is a familiar point that capital investment in agricul-
ture by either tenant or landlord will be discouraged by share-
cropping, unless on a cooperative basis, as only a fraction of the
marginal return will accrue to the investor.
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in the United -States, and when tenants can also move easily to
other employment th power of the landlord is limited. But where
the cost of movement is great, either in terms of economic resources
required or in terms of the cultural shift involved., the landlords'
power to force the tenant to subsistence ill be greater. It is
this, we suggest, as well as relative lack of financial institu-
tions in rural areas which explains the observed increase in rural
interest rates with the distance from urban centers in India, for
example. Such patterns vould probably also be found in other
countries.
The functions of rent taking, loan giving and interest-collecting
and inventory controlling are often combined because they are
closely related in rural sectors. But they may also be and often
are performed by different sets of people. In the latter case
landlords can find themselves in a situation analogous to that of
their tenants in that they are forced to subsistence levels by
the moneylender-merchant. While this leaves the moneylender-
merchant in control of the surplus above subsistence his use of
the surplus for productive purposes will depend on many personal
and cultural as well as economic factors.
In a country under population growth pressures and in which
landlords have been successful in restricting labor to the point
where total product is less than total subsistence wages, the
demand for land reform, i.e. the distribution of land to tenants
and laborers, can be expected to be great. These latter groups
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easily recognize the advantages of ownership of the scarce factor.
Depending on landlords and tenants consumption patterns there may
be no decline in saving as a result of land reform. But, if as
the result of land reform all the former rents are eaten up by
larger familieu a drastic change will have occurred in population
which will make future improvements in per capita income much
more difficult than before the land reform. Once the rents have
been destroyed by population growth, it is difficult to recapture
them for productive savings. New sources of saving will then have
to be created by technological change, shifts in time preference
and so on. Land refqrm can be a downhill road if it is not constructed
carefully.
In a community in which landlords or employer-owners try to
maximize output rather than profits or rents, the emergence of a
class of optimizing entrepreneur-employers must be a profoundly
disruptive development. If they can obtain land, they can earn
profits, because they need pay no more than the going subsistence
wage. Since they are more efficient in their use of labor they
can command larger markets and displace existing producers. They
may introduce new products and new technology if those permit a
better adjustment of labor force to the available land. If they
are savers they will accumulate land. In the process they are
bound to displace labor and cause unemployment. They end by
transforning the countryside.
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The changes from traditional adjustments to new marginal
adjustments can take place independently of changes in technology
and/or products. However, these can provide the occasion for the
entrepreneur-employer to emerge and begin his far-reaching changes.
In the economic turmoil engendered by technical change, resistence
to other types of breaks with tradition may be .lowered. On the
other hand, it seems reasonable to expect that in the ferment which
accompanies the emergence of a new employer class the barriers to
technical change will be lowered.
B. The Nonagricultural Sectors.
The maintenance of life even at low subsistence levels does
not imply an abser-ce of manufactured products. There can be a
variety of manufactured goods produced although not as wide a
variety as within advanced economies. These goods will form part
of subsistence consumption or part of the gross investment required
to maintain the capital stock. Over-all subsistence does not neces-
sarily imply handicraft technology either. However, in such economies
there is likely to be a good deal of labor intensive home craft
because of the low marginal productivity of labor on the land.
Textiles are a classic example of a subsistence manufactured
good; utensils, tobacco products, processed foodstuffs are others.
There is a great deal of variety in vhat are considered the "essen-
tials" of life not only because of culture differences but also
because of climate and resources. We suggest that the prominent
role of textiles in economic development is due to its high rank
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as a subsistence good. If there are surpluses in income above
food requirements it is the demand for textiles which expands
before other types of goods. This ranking could also be made in
terms of sensitivity of demand to interest rate changes, which
would indicate the "postponability" of its consumption, or in
terms of the income elasticities of demand at subsistence income
levels. 1
Associated with income inequalities there will be, even in
a subsistence economy, a demand for luxury goods: house fur-
uiishings, expensive textiles, ornaments and, in recent times,
automobiles, appliances, and so on. This luxury demand may be
sufficient to support a sizeable industry, as, for exam le the
Benares handicraft silk industry.
Government even in a subsistence economy will also call
forth supply for its particular requirements so that, for example,
an armaments industry could develop based on the military require-
ments.
Though without net saving and investment, a subsistence economy
would have gross saving and replacement of capital. These require-
ments can be sufficient to support a small capital goods sector
producing, say, agricultural implements. While the industry
may be of a village character with the local blacksmith producing
the reqpired implements, it may alternatively become quite substan-
tal and highly organized.
1. The character of the recent Indian inflation makes clear,
if there was any doubt, that textiles have less of a subsistence
character than staple foods. The rise in food prices due to a poor
series of crops has led to a fall in demand for cotton textiles.
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These varied demands even at subsistence levels can support
a producers goods industry, a minerals-producing sector, a
chemical industry and even a substantial service sector. While
it is true that a lesser variety of goods will be produced in low
income than..n advanced countries, it would be mistaken to con-
ceive of all subsistence of near-subsistence economies as being
simple food producers.
In a self-sufficient village economy there would be little
need for a separate transportation sector, since the peasant would
provide his own with possibly some slight specialization of func-
tion. In such a village economy the introduction of railroads
or highways would have little effect via reduction of transport
costs, since, due to lack of surpluses, relatively small amounts
of goods would move in trade. However, to the extent that there
were local specializations either in agriculture or industry,
transport costs would be an important element, '.. The use of
labor and other resources in manufacturing in subsistence
economies can be analyzed analogously to agricultural sectors.
As pointed out there will be some demand for manufactured products
even in simple economies. In filling this demand the manufacturing
sector will combine lebor with other resources in proportions
depending not only on available factor endoments but also on
the organization of the "firm.
Suppose we imagine the manufactures being supplied by small
artisan industries. The working force in these industries may be
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subject to Malthusian population growth just as in agriculture.
Subsistence requirements, even if at different levels for the
artisan sector than for agriculture, will operate analogously to
limit population growth. In fact, of course, the artisan workers
are often closely intermixed in villages with agricultural workers.
There are societies, however, in which they are segregated in
their own villages or urban areas.
The behavior of the self--employed artisan in using labor with
other resources in a Malthusian sector can be analyzed as in
Figure 2b. Labor inputs would tend to expand to L. where average
product was equal to subsistence. There would be randmly operating
factors similar, but not identical to those described for the
rural sector; these would tend to create inequality and also to
prevent its being permanent. Much of the artisan sector would
not be affected directly by variability in weather, water and
land fertility and, therefore, would be relatively immme from
that set of random influences. We can also find in subsistence
artisan industry the phenomenon of high interest rates associated
with subsistence agriculture; such a phenomenon would arise from
similar sources and have similar functions to those in agriculture.
One element sems to be lacking in creating a substantial
similarity between conditions in agriculture and artisan activity:
the landlord. But in fact he has his cousins in manufacturing.
The landlord owns the scarce agricultural resources of land, and,
perhaps, capital. To gain access to these in a Malthusian
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economy, or, more generally where no alternatives are available,
the rural worker must bid his wages down to subsistence. The
landlord's cousin in manufacturing owns the inventories of raw
and semifinished capital and perhaps, tools and equipment. To
obtain access to these the handicraft worker without alternatives
will also have to accept subsistence vages. This pattern in
artisan industry will probably be most clear where the capital
(especially inventories)--output ratio is high for then the
accumulation required of the individual artisan to establish and
remain an independent, self-employed worker is high relative to
his income.
The "cousin" who performs the landlord-like functions in
artisan industry is the merchant or' the Verlager, the operator
of the putting out system, or the factory employer. As in
agriculture here also landlords and their cousins are not
necessarily economic men in making optimum use of labor with
their other resources. And even when they try to be, they run
into the barriers of traditional patterns of organization of
economic activity, traditional wages and prices. Nor can permanent
inequalities which do exist be guaranteed to result in saving and
productive investment rather than high living and/or gold hoarding.
In artisan industry also the disruptive influence of the
entrepreneur-employer in a subsistence sector of self-employed
owner-operators or traditional and "inefficient" merchants and
workers is profound. It may, in fact, be easier to perceive the
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effects of the intrusion of the entrepreneur-employers in manu-
facturing than in agriculture. Since he combines labor more
efficiently with other resources than do the self-employed he will
make profits. By offering his goods in competition with the self-
employed who are already close to subsistence, the entrepreneur-
employer can make use of his profit margins to cut prices and
force his competition out of business. It is easy to imagine this
happening on the lowest level on the local market-days when the
entrepreneur-employer or his agent offers his wares in his stall
at lower prices below those which can keep the shop-keeper arti-
san and his fami.y alive. Of course, if the self-employed artisan
is above subsistence there will be some cudhion which will soften
and delay the effects of this radical change in business organiza-
tion.
The process of displacement may take many forms. If the
artisan is at subsistence levels the entrepreneur-employer can
make an offer to him to buy his inventories and employ him at
the going wages. More of other resources can then be given to
the new employee and the profits taken by the employer. One
result of the process is likely to be unemployment as other
artisans are displaced. The capital-labor ratio and the marginal
and average productivities of labor in this case will rise.
Another somewhat different and important pattern can be
observed. Suppose labor has a primary occupation which satisfies
part of its subsistence requirements. Then, if it has no alterna-
tives it must accept, and can be hired at wage rates which are at
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less than subsistence levels but at least equal to its marginal
productivity in its primary occupation. This may make it
possible for entrepreneur-employers to use labor more intensively
than it is used by household firms.1 In agriculture the primary
occupation will typically be a small plot of land owned by the
individual family. But, as explained above, auch ownership cannot
persist, in the absence .of some special conditions of production
or institutional protection, against aggressive employer-landlords.
The fact is, however, that small land-owner-farm wage-laborer
combinations do persist, this indicates either that the necessary
protective institutions or production conditions exist, or that
aggressive landlords are absent.
Industrial employers can similarly make use of labor at
wages less than subsistence rates or the going rates in house-
hold firms, if the labor employment is in addition to an occupa-
tion which pays at least the other part of the worker's subsis-
tence requirements. It is quite common for agriculture to provide
theaternative occupation in many industrial complexes. The "mill
town" represents the location of a factory exactly to take advantage
of such possibilities. Industrialization which makes use of a
labor force whose ties to agriculture have been broken must pay
at least subsistence wages, and employers lose an advantage they
might otherwite have. Part of the success of Japanese industriali-
zation may be explained by the persistence of this tie.
1. This point emerged from a most useful conversation with
Professor P. A. Samuelson.
VP
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As pointed out in the discussion of annlogous developments
in agriculture, technological changes may be associated with the
changes in work organization which are in turn associated with the
emergence of employers. These changes vill, in fact, often be
closely interdependent. The exploitation of new technology may
involve operation at levels not achievable by individual, self-
employed artisans and thus would be an incentive to the emergence
of a class of entrepreneur-employers. On the other hand, the
existence of such people would, in turn, be a stimulus to the
development of new technologies. However, the role of the inno-
vator of new technology is logically and, often, practically
distinct from the role of the employer who uses existing technologies
with different factor proportions than the self-employed. The
close relation of the roles has tended to blur their distinctions
and the prominent place given to the technological innovator in
economic theory and history has somewhat obscured the significance
of the social innovator Vao acts as a profit-maximizing employer
in sectors formerly characterized by self-employed.
Much of what has been ritten about agriculture and industry
can also be said about the service sectors: wholesaling, retailing,
repeit, and personal services and so on. Organizational forms and
production methods can run the gamuts described in agriculture and
manufacturing. It is often hard to distinguish manufacturing from
service firms. This distinction is most difficult when the firm
produces items to ordergather than for stock and general distribution.
to
In the case of production to order the conditions of sale are
more like the sale of services. Goods produced to order are
likely to be less standardized than goods for general distribution.
and, for this reason, less subject to copetitive pricing pressures.
Conditions of production, variations of output with factor
inputs, and contacts with other sectors are likely to be different
for service industries than for agriculture and manufacturing.
These differences will, in turn, affect the ease of entry into
services and the movement from service into other sectors.
C. Technol naand Technologcal C in Subsistence Economies.
Subsistence conditions do not necessarily imply that the
marginal productivity of labor is zero but only that it is less
than or equal to subsistence requirements of labor. However,
there may very well be disguised unemployment in. subsistence
sectors as shown in Figure 3 above. Various rigidities, social
as well as technological will prevent such ine ployment from being
spread over the entire economy. Seasonal unemployment is common
in agriculture, for example, even in relatively sparsely populated
areas. When the marginal productivity of the labor of the family
on the land falls to zero it can and will occupy itself in other
types of activity if that is feasible. Manufactured goods which
can be produced by home crafts will be. If they are not, it can
be regarded as evidence that it is not technically feasible, or
not economic due to other resource requirements even when the
imputed wage in agriculture is zero; or it may be that the wage,
V0
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in fact, is not regarded as zero. This may be due to social and
prestige factors or the existence of alternatives with positive
returns. 1
Technological change can occur in a low-level subsistence
economy even in the absence of net investment by replacement of
fully depreciated capital with equipment embodying new and
different technologies. The effect in such cases will be to
displace traditional methods, say an artisan group, with factory
production. This effect will be even more profound in static
than growing economies. It is. impossible to estimate, but it is
certainly conceivable that the replacement of the traditional
handicraft textile worker in India by the modern mill industry
did not lead to any increase in total capital invested in pro-
ducing textiles.
Replacement of traditional methods with technologies in
which available factors are more productive is the equivalent of
a windfall igain in wealth. The resulting rise in output could set
off a process of growth, depending on whether savings increased or
whether the higher output was also rbed by greater consumption,
including the possibility of population growth.
Thus technological change is not inconsistent with a low-
level subsistence economy. The historic concern with technological
unemployment suggests that this is the case. To put the issue
1. The latter factors help explain the apparent lack of success
of the rural hand-spinning program in India. The supposed surplus
labor on the farms may not be surplus at the wage offered or may
be kept back by prestige considerations.
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positively, it is our hypothesis that in subsistence economies
the motive for investment in technological improvements is in
the displacement of existing techniques rather than for satisfac-
tion of expanding markets. Investors of the latter type would indeed
have to worry about "balanced growth" and their dependence on
satisfaction of such growth conditions would be so great as to
discourage the investment. However, investors in new technology
can, and we suggest, typically do count on gaining markets by
displacing older methods. It is a much surer market than that
promised by growth.
Technologic*. change, in turn, often requires organizational
changes in the economy. New techniques may require "lumpy" invest-
ments, even if gross and not net, and these my be virtually
impossible for an individual artisan enterprise system. The
technological innovator must, therefore, also often be a social
innovator as well, and combine both functions in the role of the
entrepreneur-employer.
One special area of technological change and investment is in
transportation because it does more than reduce some intermediate
costs. It can connect formerly isolated regions with different
relative prices and thus make possible gains from specialization
and trade.
Conclusion.
Economic growth historiahily has taken place in a variety
of ways in terms of the stimuli which have set it off, the sectors
41
within which it has been initiated, the patterns in which savings
and investment have been generated, and so on. Future development
is bound to add even more variety to the picture. The focus of
this paper was on the conditions of static, subsistence economies.
These too show great variety. It was our intention by trying to
analyze and organize this variety to illuminate both the barriers
to growth and its sources. It is clear that underdeveloped economies
may be virtually one sector economies, pastoral or agricultural,
with varying degrees of income inequality, depending on the type
of land ovnership system that exists, the degree of maility, and
many randomly operating influences having their sources not only
in the conditions of production but also in the patterns of
consumption. Hoever, subsistence countries may also be not only
multi-layered socially, but multi-sectored occupationally, producing
a wide variety of consumer and capital goods. The most advanced
technologies can be used in some sectors while others remain
technologically primitive though often optimal in terms of the
existing factor endoiments. Subsistence economies need not be
either simple, in terms of their economic structures, nor unchanging.
Among the types of changes which have been most commonly con-
sidered as having an effect on growth in subsistence economies
are changes in factor availabilities and technology. These are
undoubtedly significant and far-reaching. It is not to minimize
their importance that we have emphasized here the changes in
resource combination which are associated with changes in the
0distribution of their ownership. Recognition that such associations
may exist creates major complications for the testing of hypotheses
about the effects of technological or organizational change. The
complications are essential, however; identification of one type
of change must take into account the possibility of the other.
Finally a similar point can be made about the emergence of
profit-maximizing entrepreneurs. Their appearance depends also
on the existence of forms of ec6nomic organization in which profit-
maximization makes sense and is feasible. If such forms do not
exist and cannot be created due to institutional restrictions,
entrepreneurial activity comes to nothing. To identify changes
in entrepreneurial activity with the evolution of individuals with
the appropriate motivations requires also the identification of
the role of changes in the forms of organization .of economic
activity.
